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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
SECURITIES LAW-Prospectus Must Reflect Developments 
Subsequent to Effective Date of Registration Statement 
To Meet Requirements of Section IO(a) of Securities 
Act of 1933-SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.* 
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., made a public offering of 450,000 
shares of its common stock at a price of ten dollars per share.1 Under 
the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,2 a registration statement 
containing a prospectus was filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. These documents represented that the offering would 
be on a best efforts, "all-or-nothing" basis-that is, if all the 450,000 
shares were not sold by a specified selling deadline, the proceeds of 
any sales would be returned to subscribers. The prospectus stated 
that subscribers' funds would be segregated in an escrow account 
and that arrangements to establish such an account had already been 
made. Finally, the registration statement represented that the shares 
would be sold only for cash. Contrary to these representations, no 
escrow account was ever established, Manor's principals disposed of 
shares for other than cash consideration, and the offering was closed 
before complete dispersal of the shares. In addition to these mis-
representations, the registration statement and prospectus failed to 
reveal that certain individuals and brokers would receive special 
compensation for their participation in the offering. 
The sale of Manor's shares began on December 8, 1969, the ef-
fective date of the registration statement. When the underwriter 
encountered difficulty disposing of the stock, other brokers were 
induced to participate in the offering by promises of special com-
pensation, including shares of the offered stock. In one case, Manor's 
controlling shareholder guaranteed a personal loan to a broker and 
used proceeds of the offering to purchase collateral for the guarantee. 
After it became clear that not all of the 450,000 shares had been sold, 
Manor's principals resorted to various transactions designed to "sell" 
additional shares. Sales commissions of a brokerage firm, some legal 
fees for the offering, and even outstanding indebtedness to trade 
creditors were paid in securities, despite the registration statement's 
provision that the securities would be issued only for cash. In 
addition, proceeds of sales to public investors were used to purchase 
over 30,000 of the offered shares on behalf of corporations controlled 
by a securities lawyer who was the special counsel to Manor for the 
offering. Through these "bootstrap" transactions and the issuance 
• 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). 
I. The various transactions at issue are chronicled by the court at 458 F.2d at 1088-94. 
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970). 
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of shares for consideration other than cash, "Manor and its principals 
were able to make it appear that all 450,000 shares had been sold."3 
However, as a result of defaults in payment for 270,000 shares by 
two brokers and the various "sales" that failed to bring in any addi-
tional cash, less than 1.4 million dollars was actually realized from 
public investors, although a proper "all-or-nothing" sale would have 
yielded 4.5 million dollars. No one connected with the offering at-
tempted to return any of the proceeds to the public investors. 
In an action brought by the SEC in federal district court4 pur-
suant to section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 19335 and section 27 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 the court found that Manor's 
principals, undenvriters, and participating brokers had violated the 
antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the prospectus-
delivery requirements of the 1933 Act. Certain defendants were 
enjoined from further violations of the Acts, all defendants were 
ordered to disgorge proceeds of the offering as well as income earned 
on such proceeds, a trustee was appointed to receive such funds for 
subsequent distribution to the investors, and the assets of the de-
fendants were frozen pending the transfer of such funds to the 
trustee.7 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's findings and orders, except the order that defendants 
disgorge income earned from the proceeds of the offering.8 It held 
that section IO(b) of the 1934 Act9 and rule l0(b)-910 were violated 
3. 458 F .2d at 1092. 
4. 340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970). 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). 
7. 340 F. Supp. at 936. 
8. 458 F.2d at 1100-06. 
9. 15 u.s.c. § 78j(b) (1970): 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange--
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors. 
See A.T. Brod &: Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967) (section lO(b) prohibits 
all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities). 
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-9 (1972): 
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deception device or contrivance,'' as used 
in section I0(b) of the Act, for any person ••• to make any representation: 
(1) To the effect that the security is being offered or sold on an "all-or-none" 
basis, unless the security is part of an offering or distribution being made on the 
condition that all or a specified amount of the consideration paid for such secu• 
rity will be promptly refunded to the purchaser unless (i) all of the securities 
being offered are sold at a specified price within a specified time, and (ii) the 
total amount due to the seller is received by him by a specified date • . • • 
The rule further excepts the situation where there is a firm commitment from under• 
writers for the purchase of all the securities being offered. 
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by defendants' failure to dispose of Manor's shares on an "all-or-
nothing" basis after the registration statement and prospectus had 
represented that this was to be the nature of the offering.11 It also 
held that the failure of the prospectus to reflect developments sub-
sequent to the effective date of the registration statement made the 
prospectus misleading in several material respects and in violation of 
the antifraud provisions of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act12 and 
section IO(b) of the 1934 Act.13 
Although these violations would have been sufficient to support 
the remedies ordered by the court, the Manor opinion went beyond 
the antifraud provisions to find a violation of the prospectus-delivery 
requirement of section 5(b)(2) of the 1933 Act.14 The basis of this 
finding was the court's conclusion that a prospectus does not meet the 
requirements of section lO(a) of the 1933 Act15 if it is untrue or be-
comes untrue during the period after the effective date of the regis-
tration statement.16 Since the Manor prospectus did not reflect de-
velopments during the post-effective period, it thus failed to comply 
with section IO(a), and the use of the prospectus by defendants in 
connection with the sale of securities violated the prospectus-delivery 
requirement of section 5(b)(2). 
Afanor is the first case squarely to consider whether an inaccurate 
prospectus satisfies section IO(a) for purposes of section 5(b)(2). The 
thesis of the present discussion is that section IO(a) requires no more 
than a prospectus that conforms to the registration statement; alter-
natively, if some requirement of truth is read into section IO(a), this 
requirement should be no greater than that for the registration state-
ment itself, and therefore truth should be judged as of the effective 
date of the registration. Under either alternative, developments dur-
ing the post-effective period that render the registration statement 
II. 458 F.2d at 1095. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970): 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the 
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(!) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material 
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
13. 458 F.2d at 1094-95. 
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1970) provides: 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any 
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied 
or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of sec-
tion 77j of this title [section l0(a) of the 1933 Act]. 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(l) (1970) reads in part, "a prospectus relating to a security ••• 
shall contain the information contained in the registration statement • . • ." 
16. 458 F.2d at 1098-100. 
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and the prospectus untrue would not invalidate the prospectus un-
der section IO(a) and would not subject defendants to liability for 
violation of section 5(b)(2). 
The Manor court did not discuss the reasons for its holding that 
section IO(a) contains an implict requirement that the prospectus be 
truthful. However, the court cited SEC v. North American Finance 
Co.,17 in which the Arizona district court stated that use of a prospec-
tus containing a material misrepresentation was "in violation of sec-
tion 5(b) of the Securities Act ... and may have given rise to liabil-
ities to purchasers under Section 12(1) of the Act .... "18 The Arizona 
court did suggest one ground for reading a truth requirement into 
section IO(a) when it stated: 
The registration process and the requirement for delivery of a pros-
pectus meeting the statutory standards are intended to require 
full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities being sold, 
thereby making available to investors the information necessary in 
exercising an informed opinion as to the quality and nature of the 
investment.19 
The goal of "full and fair disclosure" could not be realized if the 
prospectus, on which investors must depend for information about 
an offering, contains untrue statements. Thus, the argument runs, 
there must be an implicit requirement in section IO(a) that the dis-
closures made by the prospectus be truthful.20 
17. 214 F. Supp. 197 (D. Ariz. 1959). North American's registration statement and 
prospectus were certified by one of its principal bookkeepers, who represented that he 
was an "independent accountant" as required by section 7 and schedule A of the 1933 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa (1970). The SEC charged North American and a broker• 
dealer copartnership with violating section 5(b) of the 1933 Act by offering and selling 
securities in interstate commerce without complying with the section 10 prospectus 
requirements; engaging in fraudulent and deceptive transactions in violation of section 
17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act; and obtaining money and property by means of untrue state• 
ments and omissions of material fact in violation of section 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. 
The copartnership was also charged with inducing the purchase of stock through 
manipulative and deceptive devices in violation of section 15(c)(l) of the 1934 Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78o(c)(l) (1970). 214 F. Supp. at 199-200. 
18. 214 F. Supp. at 201. 
19. 214 F. Supp. at 201 n.2. In subsequent proceedings, the SEC revoked the broker-
dealer registration of the firm involved in North American. Eugene Rosenson, 40 S.E.C. 
948 (1961). In finding that the firm had willfully violated sections 7 and 10 of the 1933 
Act by filing false and misleading registration statements and prospectuses, the SEC 
stated: "It is implicit in the requirements of Sections 7 and 10 that a registration state-
ment and prospectus contain certain information, and that such information be true 
and correct." 40 S.E.C. at 952. However, it should be noted that this language repre-
sented at best an alternative holding. The Commission had already found that North 
American's broker-dealer had willfully violated the antifraud provisions of the secu-
rities acts, 40 S.E.C. at 95, and this finding was sufficient to support the Commission's 
revocation of the broker-dealer's registration. 
20. As further support for its finding of a truth requirement in section lO(a), the 
Manor court analogized to several SEC proceedings which had stated or suggested that 
rules 17a-3 to -5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3 to -5 (1972), under section 17(a) of 1934 Act, 
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Despite the surface appeal of this argument, the basic structure 
of the 1933 Act suggests that while there is a requirement of truth 
for the prospectus, it is not contained in section I0(a). One court 
described the program embodied in the 1933 Act as follows: 
The program has two major aspects: One relates generally to dis-
closure of pertinent information in connection with offerings of 
securities to the public whether by way of primary or secondary dis-
tributions so that investors may have an opportunity to exercise an 
informed judgment; the other • . . is designed to curb fraud and 
deception by imposing liability for misrepresentations.21 
More specifically, section 5 of the 1933 Act makes it unlawful to en-
gage in distribution of securities without filing a registration state-
ment and delivering a prospectus.22 Sections 723 and 1024 specify the 
contents of these documents. Violation of section 5 subjects a secu-
rities vendor to civil liability under section 12(1).211 Sections 5, 7, 10, 
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970), requiring broker-dealers to maintain and file certain records, 
implicitly required that these statements be true. 458 F.2d at 1098 n.22. The court cited 
Lowell Niebuhr & Co., 18 S.E.C. 471 (1945); Herman Bud Rothbard, SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 5998 (June 30, 1959); and Pilgrim Sec., Inc., SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 5958 (May 15, 1959). None of these cases involved section 
IO(a) of the 1933 Act. Furthermore, the Commission found "willful" violations of sec-
tion 17(a) of the 1934 Act in these cases. Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) 
(1970), the provision affected by Manor, would impose liability regardless of the willful-
ness of the conduct. These cases are also distinguishable on the ground that the liability 
for failure to comply with the truth requirement was imposed directly on the broker-
dealer responsible for the misrepresentation in contrast with the potential for deriva-
tive liability in Manor for violation of section 12(1). In Rothbard and Pilgrim the 
Commission rested its revocation of the broker-dealers' registration on multiple viola-
tions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts rather than solely on the violation of the section 17(a) 
implicit truth requirement. For these reasons the broker-dealer records cases provide 
inadequate precedent for the Manor court's holding. 
The Manor court also cited GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971), 
where, having decided that the section IO(b) antifraud provision was inapplicable to 
the transaction at issue, the Second Circuit found an implicit truth requirement in 
section 13(d), the disclosure provision of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970)). On 
this basis, it held that injunctive relief was available to the plaintiff corporation. The 
Milstein court emphasized that this was necessary in order to give the plaintiff an effec-
tive remedy and promote the underlying policies of the Act. This rationale is inappli-
cable to section IO(a) in Manor, however, since the relief available through the antifraud 
provisions was more than adequate. 
21. Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). 
23. 15 u.s.c. § 77g (1970). 
24. 15 u.s.c. § 77j (1970). 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970) reads in part: 
Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title [section 5 of the 
1933 Act] shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may 
sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the 
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any 
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no 
longer owns the security. 
596 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:591 
and 12(1) thus carry out the disclosure aspect of the 1933 Act's pro-
gram. The other aspect of the program, that concerned with preven-
tion of fraud and deception, is embodied in sections 11,26 12(2),27 and 
17(a).28 As will be demonstrated, these latter sections provide ample 
sanctions for misrepresentations in a prospectus.29 Manor scrambled 
the carefully delineated functions of the Act's two distinct aspects 
when it read a truth requirement into section IO(a). 
Close scrutiny of specific provisions of the 1933 Act reveals the 
deficiency in Manor's interpretation of the prospectus-delivery re-
quirement. Under section 5(b)(2), it is unlawful for any person to 
transmit in interstate commerce any registered security for the pur-
pose of sale unless accompanied by a prospectus that complies with 
section IO(a). With some exceptions not material in this context, sec-
tion IO(a)(I) requires that a prospectus contain "the information con-
tained in the registration statement."30 This language was adopted 
as part of the 1954 amendments to the 1933 Act and replaced the 
Act's original language, which required that the prospectus contain 
the "same statements made" in the registration statement.31 The 1954 
Senate Committee Report made this comment on the change in 
phrasing: 
This conforms to a long standing interpretation and eliminates any 
doubt that, to meet the requirements of Section IO(a), a prospectus 
need not repeat information in the exact form in which it appears in 
other parts of the registration statement. [The amended section] con-
tinue[ s] the existing statutory requirements as to the contents of the 
full prospectus which must be used in connection with the "sale" of 
registered securities. 32 
The amendment was thus directed at the form of the prospectus, and 
no change in substantive requirements was contemplated. The phrase 
"information contained in," as it appears in the amended version of 
section IO(a), may be read as substantially equivalent to the phrase 
"same statements made" in the original Act. 
Legislative history lends support to the view that the phrase "same 
statements made"-and thus the present language "information con-
tained in"-should be interpreted to require only that a prospectus 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (1970). 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). 
29. See notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text. 
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(l} (1970). The prospectus often constitutes a part of the regis-
tration statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.404(a) (1972) (prospectus may be filed in lieu of 
item and answer form); SEC, Form S-1, General Instructions C, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. ~ 7122 (1972) (suggesting that a prospectus be filed as part of the registration 
statement). 
31. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 81. 
32. S. REP. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954). 
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substantially mirror the registration statement. A House Committee 
Report, supporting the enactment of the 1933 Act, contained an ex-
pression of this view: "[A security] ... may be sold ... only if the 
buyer is given a substantial replica of the information included in 
the 'registration statement' .... "33 Furthermore, the interpretation 
of section IO(a) by the Federal Trade Commission, the predecessor 
of the SEC, and scholarly commentary support this "mirror image" 
view of that section's requirements. For example, in a 1933 article 
discussing the incidence of section 12(1) liability, Professor Harry 
Shulman stated: 
The first part of Section 12 does not deal with the truth or falsity 
of the representations in the registration statement or prospectus. It 
puts upon the seller only the burden of ascertaining the existence of 
a registration statement and the conformity of the prospectus with 
that statement.34 
The FTC delineated the requirements of section IO(a) in an early 
release by reference to a situation in which the issuer desired to sub-
stitute new information for that contained in the prospectus. In those 
circumstances, "since under the Rules of the Commission the pros-
pectus must not omit certain items contained in the registration state-
ment, such changes can be effected only by a regular amendment to 
the statement filed with the Commission."35 
33. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933) (emphasis added). See also 77 
CONG. REc. 2931 (1933) (remarks of Representative Wolverton). There was no suggestion 
during the debates that section IO(a) required an independent content for the pros-
pectus or that the phrase "same statements made" meant anything other than technical 
conformity. 
34. Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 243. 
35. FTC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 97, pt. 14 (Dec. 28, 1933), 11 Fed. Reg. 
10949, 1 CCH F.ED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 1028 (1971). The release further provides that 
'!lnder section 11 the accuracy of the registration statement is to be judged by the 
date upon which it becomes effective. It is, therefore, unnecessary, and probably 
impossible, to amend it to include facts which occur after its effective date. It may, 
of course, be necessary to supplement the information contained in the prospectus 
in order that it may not be misleading within the meaning of sections 12(2) and 17. 
The use of supplementary information, however, does not require an amend-
ment of the prospectus, and no further papers need, therefore, be filed with the 
Commission. On the other hand, if it is proposed to substitute new information 
for that contained in the prospectus, since under the rules of the Commission the 
prospectus must not omit certain items contained in the registration statement, 
such changes can be effected only by a regular amendment to the statement filed 
with the Commission. In any case in which it could properly be made, such an 
amendment, being filed after the effective date of the registration statement, would 
become effective itself, under section 8(c) of the Act, "on such date as the Commission 
may determine, having due regard to the public interest and the protection of 
investors." 
If, as the .l\fanor court suggests, section IO(a) imposes a truth requirement, it would 
seem that under the "supplement-substitute" rule, if it were necessary to substitute 
information into the prospectus in order to avoid section 12(2) liability for failure to 
disclose a material fact, it would also be necessary to amend the registration statement 
to avoid section 12(1) liability for nonconformity. Alternatively, it could be argued that 
the conformity requirement should only extend to information available as of the 
original date of effectiveness. See l L. Loss, SECUIUTIES REGULATION 294 (2d ed. 1961). 
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Congress did make one exception to the rule of strict conformity 
between the registration statement and the section IO(a) prospectus. 
Section IO(a)(3) deals with the situation in which a prospectus is 
used nine months after the effective date of the registration state-
ment. Under these circumstances, the information contained in the 
prospectus "shall be as of a date not more than sixteen months prior 
to such use."36 Professor Loss, in discussing section IO(a)(3), noted: 
There is no requirement that this so called "nine-month prospectus" 
be filed as an amendment to the registration statement, . . . for 
§ I0(a)(3) obviously cuts across the clause in the first part of § lO(a) 
to the effect that the prospectus shall "contain the information con-
tained in the registration statement."37 
It is significant that by enacting section IO(a)(3), Congress acknowl-
edged that the information contained in the prospectus may become 
inaccurate in some respects over the course of time. Yet, the case of 
the nine-month-old prospectus represents the only situation in which 
Congress expressly provided that the prospectus must be amended to 
avoid a section 5 violation. This suggests that in the case of a prospec-
tus less than nine months old, no more is required for purposes of 
section 5 than strict conformity with the registration statement. 
Thus, there is little in authority, history, and the structure of the 
1933 Act to support the conclusion that section IO(a) imposes an ob-
ligation of truthful disclosure on the prospectus. However, assuming 
that this conclusion was correct, the prospectus should not be held to 
a higher standard of truthfulness than that applied to the registra-
tion statement. Since the language of section IO(a) defines the con-
tent of the prospectus in terms of the information "contained in the 
registration statement," any requirement of truth for the prospectus 
should be bottomed on the truthfulness demanded of the registra-
tion statement. Therefore, section lO(a)'s language might most read-
ily be accommodated to the Manor court's finding of an obligation 
of truth in that section if the language were construed to mean that 
the prospectus must contain the information required to be in the 
registration statement-in other words, that the prospectus must 
independently meet the truth requirements of the registration state-
ment. 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(3) (1970): 
[N]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection when 
a prospectus is used more than nine months after the effective date of the registra-
tion statement, the information contained therein shall be as of a date not more 
than sixteen months prior to such use, so far as such information is known to the 
user of such prospectus or can be furnished by such user without unreasonable 
effort or expense. 
It should be noted that the reasonable effort standard imposed by this provision is 
more lenient than the absolute liability imposed by section 12(1) for a violation of 
section 5. See note 25 supra. 
37. 1 L. Loss, supra note 35, at 295. 
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In a further extension of section IO(a), however, the court in 
Afanor concluded that in order to maintain its validity the prospectus 
must reflect developments subsequent to the effective date of the reg-
istration statement.38 This means that the prospectus roust meet a 
higher standard of truthfulness than the registration statement, which 
under sections 8(d)30 and II40 must be truthful only as of the effective 
date.41 
38. 458 F.2d at 1100. 
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970): 
If it appears to the Commission at any time that the registration statement includes 
any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required 
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, the 
Commission may ••• issue a stop order suspending the effectiveness of the registra-
tion statement. When such statement has been amended in accordance with such 
stop order, the Commission shall so declare and thereupon the stop order shall cease 
to be effective. 
This section is a corollary to section S(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1970), which allows the 
Commission to refuse to permit a registration statement to become effective if it appears 
that it "is on its face incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect •••. " See Red 
Bank Oil Co., 20 S.E.C. 863 (1945), for the application of the two subsections. 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970): 
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, 
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time 
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in 
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction sue [signers of the registration 
statement; directors of and partners in the issuer; persons who with consent are 
named as about to become a director or partner; _persons who have consented 
to be named as having :prepared or certified a registration statement or valua-
tion or report used therem, including accountants, engineers, appraisers, or other 
authorized professionals; and underwriters.] 
Various defenses are built into section 11 as well as certain limitations on damages. 
Criminal liability is imposed by section 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970): 
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this subchapter, or the 
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof, or 
anr person who wHlfully, in a registration statement filed under this subchapter, 
makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
leading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years or both. 
41. There is some ambiguity on the face of the statute regarding whether the regis-
tration statement speaks only from its effective date, as the Manor court pointed out. 
458 F.2d at 1099 n.24. See I L. Loss, supra note 35, at 290-91. Liability exists under 
section II "[i]n case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effec-
tive, contained an untrue statement •••• " 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970). A stop order may 
be issued under section 8(d) "if it appears to the Commission at any time that the 
registration statement includes any untrue statement •••• " 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970) 
(emphasis added). Section 8(d) might be read to mean that the Commission may issue 
the stop order "at any time" it discovers an untrue statement which existed at the 
effective date or alternatively that it may issue a stop order "at any time" a statement 
becomes untrue, even if it is after the effective date. There is legislative history to sup• 
port the latter reading: 
In determining whether a stop order should issue, the Commission will naturally 
have regard to the facts as they then exist and will stop the further sale of secu-
rities, even though the registration statement was true when made, (and] it has 
become untrue or misleading by reason of subsequent developments. 
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1933). However, the Commission has con-
sistently supported the former, holding that section S(d) 
does not .•• permit the Commission to issue a stop order if it finds that a state-
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Although willing to assume that the registration statement does 
speak as of its effective date,42 the court in Manor stated: "Even those 
SEC decisions holding that the registration statement need not be 
amended to reflect post-effective developments recognize that the 
prospectus must be amended or supplemented in some manner to re-
flect such changes."43 However, the cases cited by Manor refer to a 
duty to disclose post-effective developments in the prospectus in order 
to avoid liabilities under sections 12(2) and 17 (a).44 There was no 
suggestion in these cases that a violation of the duty to amend would 
render the prospectus deficient for the purposes of section IO(a) and 
result in liability under section 12(1). 
Moreover, Manor's conclusion that the prospectus must reflect 
post-effective developments may have been unnecessary since the 
court might have found that the prospectus in Manor was untrue as 
ment which reflected the truth as of the time the registration statement became 
effective no longer reflects the truth. It does, however, permit the Commission at 
any time that it finds a statement does not reflect the truth as of the time that the 
registration statement became effective to issue a stop order. 
Charles A. Howard, I S.E.C. 6, IO (1934) (emphasis original). The registration statement 
must, however, be amended to encompass material developments subsequent to filing 
but prior to effectiveness. I S.E.C. at 9; Paper Sales Co. of Detroit, 2 S.E.C. 748, 752 
(1937). See also Kinner Airplane 8c Motor Corp., 2 S.E.C. 943 (1937). The Manor court 
cited Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 Guly 13, 1964), for the 
proposition that "in some situations it may be necessary to amend the registration 
statement to reflect post-effective changes." 458 F.2d at 1099 n.23. However, in 
Franchard, the registrant attempted to amend its registration statement, which was 
untrue at the effective date, to reflect post-effective developments by supplementing the 
prospectus, which was part of the registration statement. The SEC denied effectiveness 
to this method of amendment, stating: 
[T]his form of presentation is inadequate and misleading when numerous and 
significant changes in the issuer's affairs during the period between the effective 
date and the date of the post-effective amendment have clearly outdated the original 
prospectus. In such cases "supplementation" of the outmoded prospectus necessarily 
results in an obscure and uncoordinated presentation. 
Id. at 31. Thus, in Franchard the SEC was not imposing a requirement that the registra-
tion statement be amended to reflect post-effective changes; rather it was merely con-
sidering the acceptability of post-effective amendments that had already been filed by 
the issuer. 
42. 458 F.2d at 1099. Having concluded that "appellants were obliged to reflect the 
post-effective developments ••. in the prospectus," the court did not find it necessary 
to "reach the question whether the registration statement speaks only as of its effective 
date." 458 F.2d at 1099 8c n.24. 
43. 458 F.2d at 1099, citing Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, IO (1934); Funeral Direc-
tor's Mfg. 8c Supply Co., 39 S.E.C. 33, 34 (1959). 
44. Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, IO (1934). In Funeral Director's Mfg. 8: Supply 
Co., 39 S.E.C. 33, 34 (1959), the Commission observed: "For purposes of stop order 
proceedings under Section 8(d) of the Act, the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosures 
in a registration statement are to be tested as of the date the registration becomes 
effective." The Commission continued in a footnote: 
In this connection it is to be noted, however, that Sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the 
Act impose an obligation on vendors of securities which are the subject of an effec-
tive registration statement to disclose to purchasers changes in material facts 
occurring after the effective date of the registration statement which render the 
disclosures therein inaccurate. 
39 S.E.C. at 34 n.3 (emphasis added). 
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of the effective date. First, the prospectus stated that arrangements 
had been made to set up an escrow account for subscribers' proceeds; 
apparently this representation was false on the effective date.45 More-
over, it appears that, contrary to the suggestion that an escrow fund 
would be set up, the parties involved in the offering never intended 
to establish such a fund.46 Thus, the court could have found that the 
prospectus was false on the effective date because it misrepresented 
the parties' intentions.47 It might also be contended that the princi-
pals of the issuer and underwriter never intended to conform with 
the registration statement representation that shares would be sold 
only for cash and that there would be no special compensation for 
certain purchasers and brokers. Although there was no evidence di-
rectly on point, the speed with which the principals altered their 
stated plans and implemented transactions that violated the terms of 
the offer in the registration statement strongly suggests that they did 
not intend to comply with such terms at the time the statement be-
came effective.48 Through this analysis of the facts, the Manor court 
could have reached the same result without extending the require-
ment of truth that it held implict in section IO(a) beyond the effec-
tive date of the registration statement. 
In addition to the lack of theoretical support for the Manor 
court's interpretation of section IO(a), there are substantial policy 
grounds for rejecting the court's reading. Before Manor, a person 
who sold a security accompanied by an untrue prospectus or a pros-
pectus that was misleading because of post-effective developments 
could be held liable to his purchaser under section 12(2) of the 1933 
Act.40 However, such a person could avoid liability by proving that 
"he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not 
have known"50 of the alleged untruth in the prospectus. Similarly, if 
45. 458 F.2d at 1090. 
46. 458 F.2d at 1090. 
47. Evidence of conduct in direct and flagrant conflict with a particular intent 
stated in a registration statement to be then existing may, under some circumstances, 
offer a clear basis for the conclusion that this intent did not in fact exist at the 
time the statement became effective. 
National Invested Sav. Corp., 2 S.E.C. ll3, II7 (1937). 
48. See 458 F.2d at 1090-94. 
49. 15 u.s.c. § 771 (1970): 
Any person who-
(2) offers or sells a security ••• by the use of any means or instruments of trans-
portation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means 
of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of 
a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading {the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who 
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be 
liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at 
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the con-
sideration paid for such security • • . . 
50. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) {1970), set out in note 49 supra. 
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the registration statement, on which the prospectus is based, con-
tained an "untrue statement of material fact," liability was imposed 
by section 11, which also provides for a due-diligence defense.51 The 
effect of Manor is to make it a violation of section 5(b)(2) to sell a 
· , security by means of a prospectus that is untrue either as of the effec-
tive date of the registration statement or thereafter. This exposes is-
suers, underwriters, and broker-dealers to liability for the purchase 
price of the securities under section 12(1).52 Of major significance is 
the fact that unlike section 12(2), section 12(1) contains no provision 
for a reasonable care defense; liability under section 12(1) is abso-
lute. 53 
A possible consequence of imposing this burden of absolute lia-
bility under section 12(1) is to upset the proper balance between lia-
bility and nonliability in the securities business. As stated by Profes-
sor (now Justice) Douglas and Professor Bates in 1933, "risks should 
not be placed so high as to deter substantial and honest men from 
engaging in legitimate business."54 While any requirement of truth 
is not effective unless the penalties are sufficiently "severe to make it 
improvident not to tell it,"55 it is suggested that the Manor holding 
has gone beyond the need to encourage truth-telling and may deter 
honest men from engaging in securities distributions once they per-
ceive the spreading threat of section 12(1) liability. Before Manor, 
the prudent broker-dealer, for example, could feel safe in selling a 
security if there was a registration statement in effect and if the pros-
pectus mirrored that registration statement; and he was safe from lia-
bility to purchasers for untruths in the prospectus unless he failed to 
exercise due care with respect to its contents.56 Manor thus imposes 
an unnecessary, and an almost overwhelming, burden on the broker-
dealer. Not only must he determine the truth of the prospectus at the 
effective date of the registration statement, but he must continually 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), set out in part in note 40 supra. 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(l) (1970), set out in note 25 supra. Since Manor was an action by 
the SEC brought under sections 22(a) of the 1933 Act and 27 of the 1934 Act, the court 
did not discuss the implications of the case with respect to section 12 of the 1933 Act, 
a private remedy creating civil liability. 
Section 12 specifies that "Any person •.. shall be liable to the person purchasing 
such security from him .•.• " 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1970). Thus, the section provides for "an 
action by a buyer against his immediate seller." 3 L. Loss, supra note 35, at 1719. Since 
each party could join his immediate seller under FED. R. CIV. P. 14, the liability of all 
the parties could be determined in one action. Therefore, the broker would not neces-
sarily be held ultimately liable. 
53. It should be recognized that as to the underwriter, liability under both sections 
12(1) and 12(2) may be relieved by the execution of indemnification agreements; or 
warranties and undertakings in the undenmting contract may be the basis of a con-
tract action against the issuer. Certain other transactions are exempted by section 4 of 
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970). 
54. The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 172. 
55. Id. 
56. See, e.g., Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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investigate the factual basis of that document to determine that it has 
not become false and thus invalid. And despite his efforts, the broker-
dealer may find himself liable for false information in the prospectus 
when he has no effective access to the information upon which liabil-
ity may tum. For example, an issuer may deliberately conceal changes 
in circumstances that render the IO(a) prospectus void, and the 
broker-dealer will have no opportunity to protect himself from abso-
1 ute liability under section 12(1). 
Given the factual setting of Manor, the court's interpretation of 
section IO(a) was unjustified. Most of the relief sought by the SEC-
an injunction and the disgorging of proceeds retained by defendants 
--could have been granted on the basis of defendants' violations of 
section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and the general antifraud provisions of 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.57 The underwriter and broker-dealers in-
volved in the distribution of Manor stock were informed participants 
in the acts and decisions that rendered the prospectus false. Thus, 
even if suit had been brought against the defendants in Manor to re-
cover civil damages, the equities would have supported imposition of 
maximum liability under section 12(2) and the antifraud provisions. 
In factual settings unlike that in Manor, however, the court's inter-
pretation of section IO(a) could, as noted above, create inequitable 
results. 
Limiting Manor to its holding of fraud violations would prevent 
the establishment of precedents leading to extended liability for in-
nocent participants in securities offerings. In fact situations similar 
to Manor, liabilities would still be imposed for use of a false prospec-
tus through the antifraud provisions of the securities acts and section 
12(2). If further protection of the investor is needed beyond that sup-
plied by these provisions, it should be afforded through legislative 
amendments or new enactments, not by a strained judicial interpreta-
tion of section lO(a). 
57. Cf. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971), discussed in note 20 
supra. 
